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Legislation Affecting the Civil Code
and Related Subjects
Robert A. Pascal*
CIVIL CODE AMENDMENTS
Absentees
Amendments to articles 78' and 792 clarify the rights of an
heir whose existence was unknown at the time others were placed
in possession of property rightfully his. The amended article
78 extinguishes the heir's right to recover anything after the
lapse of thirty years3 from the rendition of the judgment placing
others in possession, implies that prior to that time he may re-
cover the property specifically unless it has been sold by those
placed in possession, and provides that in the latter event he may
recover only the net proceeds of the sale. This amended article
may need interpretation for other situations, for example, one
in which the persons placed in possession have donated the prop-
erty and the donees have sold it, but of course this should not be
difficult if the principle implied in the amendment is considered.
The amendment to article 79 merely makes it clear that those pos-
sessing the unknown heir's property under judgment and in
good faith shall not be made to account for the fruits received
by them before his appearance. It will be recognized that both
these amendments must have been inspired by the interpreta-
tions placed on the original articles in Bierhorst v. Kelly.4
Marriage
Act 289 of 1956 amended article 92 to shift the power to
authorize the marriage of underage persons in East Baton Rouge
Parish from the district judges to the judge of the Family Court.
The amendment to article 92 by Act 398 of 1954 had already
transferred this power in Orleans Parish from the district judges
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. Acts 1956, No. 533.
2. La. Acts 1956, No. 532.
3. Presumably this language indicates a period of peremption rather than of
prescription.
4. 225 La. 934, 74 So.2d 168 (1954).
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to the judges of the First City Court., In all other parishes the
power remains in the district judges.,
Separation from Bed and Board
A ninth cause of separation from bed and board has been
added to article 138:
"Whenever the husband and wife have voluntarily lived sep-
arate and apart for one year and no reconciliation has taken
place during that time."7
Probably there can be very little doubt that those responsible for
the drafting and enactment of this legislation intended to make
possible a separation from bed and board after the running of
half the period of "living separate and apart" presently required
for a divorce under R.S. 9:301.8 This divorce legislation and
its antecedents 9 have never made provision for the possibility
of terminating the marital property regime, awarding alimony,
or terminating parental authority over children of the marriage
and determining their tutorship before the divorce action itself.
Hence even though the principal purpose of R.S. 9:301 and its
antecedents seems to have been the elimination of the fault issue
in divorce cases, these sometimes necessary changes in the family
personal and property relationships could not be made before
filing suit for divorce unless one of the spouses had cause and
sought a separation from bed and board on one of the grounds
listed in article 138 of the Civil Code. An attempt to remedy
this situation had been made in 1948 by the introduction of
Senate Bill No. 314, under which the filing of written notice by
one of the spouses of their living separate and apart with in-
tention of claiming a divorce at the end of the required period
would itself have given rise to the effects of a judgment of sep-
aration from bed and board, but this bill was not enacted into
5. For a commentary on this legislation see Hebert & Lazarus, Legislation Af-
fecting the Civil Code, 15 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 9-11 (1954).
6. The amending act traced the existing text of article 92 even to the retention
of a grammatical error ("if any of them are") and language inappropriate to our
institutions ("guardians" for "tutors"; "marriage certificate" for "act of mar-
riage").
7. La. Acts 1956, No. 303, § 1.
8. "When married persons have been living separate and apart for a period of
two years or more, either party to the marriage contract may sue, in the courts
of his or her residence within this state, provided such residence shall have been
continuous for the period of two years, for an absolute divorce, which shall be
granted on proof of the continuous living separate and apart of the spouses, during
the period of two years or more."
9. La. Acts 1916, No. 269, and amendments.
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law. The writer believes the principal motive behind the legis-
lation under discussion must have been the easing of this situa-
tion and therefore that its drafters and enactors must have in-
tended the new cause of separation to be any living separate and
apart for one year of a kind which, if continued for two years,
would entitle either spouse to a divorce under R.S. 9:301.
The ordinary meaning of the language of the new cause for
separation from bed and board, however, does not support this
interpretation. The important words in the statement of the
new cause for separation are "when the husband and wife have
voluntarily lived separate and apart." (Emphasis added).
Grammatically and lexicographically this legislation requires
that the separate living be mutually voluntary. R.S. 9:301 does
not have the word "voluntarily" in its text 10 and the judicial
interpretation has been that the separate living must be the
result of a voluntary or intentional act on the part of at least
one of the parties, but not necessarily of both, to terminate the
conjugal life." Thus the living separate and apart required by
the new legislation, if construed according to the normal mean-
ing of words in the English language, is more limited than that
required by R.S. 9:301 as interpreted. 2
Forced Heirship
Article 1494 has been amended 13 by the addition of a proviso
which in effect limits the legitime or forced inheritance of a
10. See note 8 supra.
11. Leveque v. Borns, 174 La. 919, 142 So. 126 (1932) ; Otis v. Bahan, 209
La. 1082, 26 So.2d 146 (1946).
12. The writer does not ignore but does not purport to discuss here the ap-
plications of the laws concerning the effects of separation from bed and board
to separations obtained under this amendment. Nevertheless it may be mentioned
that the rules on the loss or retention of the advantages and donations by one
spouse to the other (Civil Code art. 156) and the primary rule on the tutorship
and custody of the children (Civil Code art. 157) are phrased in terms which
presuppose that the party against whom the separation judgment has been pro-
nounced has been guilty of fault (i.e., a violation of a marital obligation legis-
latively defined as a cause for separation), whereas "voluntarily living separate
and apart" ignores the fault issue entirely. Thus an application of these rules to
separations obtained under the new "cause" could result in a miscarriage of justice
if the party cast actually has not been at any fault. Similarly, after divorce
based on article 139 of the Civil Code and R.S. 9:302 (non-reconciliation for a
stated period following a separation judgment) the innocent wife cast in the
judgment of separation may lose all right to alimony, and the innocent husband
cast in the separation judgment may be compelled to pay alimony to the wife
actually at fault. These problems sufficiently illustrate that it would be well for
legislators introducing and acting on bills affecting so highly integrated legisla-
tion as the Civil Code to obtain the advice of persons learned in its plan and
intricacies.
13. La. Acts 1956, No. 313.
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surviving parent to one-third of the property of the deceased
or his intestate share, whichever is less. This amendment gives
legislative sanction to the principle of the decision in the Suc-
cession of Greenlaw1 4 and thereby eliminates the conflict be-
tween article 1494 and articles 904 and 911 of the Civil Code.
REVISED STATUTES AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS
Absentees
R.S. 9:171-178 authorized partition by private sale of prop-
erty of which a record owner was either an absentee unrepre-
sented of record or a person whose whereabouts were unknown,
and prescribed the procedure therefor. The pertinent parts of
this legislation have been amended (1) to broaden its application
to instances in which "any co-owner, or possible claimant of any
interest in the property, cannot be found or is an absentee, or
it is not known if he be alive or dead,"'15 and (2) to cause the
judgment authorizing the partition by private sale itself to con-
stitute authority to the curator ad hoc of the absent or unknown
parties of interest to execute the act of partition.16 In other re-
spects the import of the original legislation seems unchanged.' 7
Marriage
R.S. 9:204-206, which state the conditions under which a
marriage may be celebrated in less than seventy-two hours after
the issuance of a license, were amended I8 to shift the authority
to grant dispensations from the basic law, so far as East Baton
Rouge Parish only is concerned, from the district judges to the
Family Court. The authority for Orleans Parish had been trans-
ferred to the First City Court in 1954.19 These amendments are
similar to that made to article 92 of the Civil Code.20
Abandonment and Adoption
The legislation on matters relating to abandonment has been
amended in several respects.
14. 148 La. 255, 86 So. 786 (1920).
15. La. Acts 1956, No. 534.
16. Ibid.
17. La. Acts 1928, No. 96, as amended by La. Acts 1948, No. 457.
18. La. Acts 1956, No. 288, §§ 1-3.
19. La. Acts 1954, No. 399.
20. See page 22 supra.
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(1) R.S. 9:403 (A), which defines abandonment by a parent,
contained a clause under which a parent denied custody by
judicial action would not be deemed to have abandoned the child
by reason of his not having taken "physical care" of it. This
clause has been amended in fact by the addition of R.S.
9:403(D),21 which limits its application to parents who have
been denied custody in proceedings "incidental to an action for
divorce or separation from bed and board." The amendment goes
too far. Certainly a parent who has been denied custody, what-
ever the reason, can hardly be expected to give it "physical
care."
(2) An amendment to R.S. 9:403(C) 22 seems designed in
part to permit the court decreeing a child abandoned to place it
in the custody of private persons or an adoption agency, as its
"best interest" might indicate. Formerly the child could be placed
with an adoption agency only. The same amendment also deletes
a provision of the original section under which even after the
facts constituting abandonment had been proved, a parent could
assume responsibility for the child or show good reasons for his
failure to do so and thereby put an end to the abandonment pro-
ceeding.
(3) The new section R.S. 9:40623 places a limitation of sixty
days from the effective date of the enacting statute on suits to
annul decrees of abandonment rendered prior to the effective
date of the statute.
(4) A new section R.S. 9:40724 permits an agency having
custody of an abandoned child either to place it for adoption or
to provide it with other care, as its best interest might indicate.
This new section corresponds to section 5 of Act 227 of 1948,
left out of the Revised Statutes of 1950 apparently in the belief
that the termination of parental rights by a decree of abandon-
ment provided for by R.S. 9:404 was sufficient.
Custody
R.S. 9:551-9:553 carried into the Revised Statutes the pro-
visions of Act 79 of 1894, the first legislation separating the
21. La. Acts 1956, No. 185.
22. La. Acts 1956, No. 176.
23. La. Acts 1956, No. 181.
24. La. Acts 1956, No. 183.
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custody of children from their tutorship and permitting the
award of their custody to persons other than those entitled to
their tutorship when their physical or moral welfare was seri-
ously endangered by those in whose actual custody they were.
This legislation vested the then new power in the district courts.
Subsequently juvenile and family courts were given similar
power and now Act 111 of 1956 has repealed R.S. 9:551-9:553,
with the result that such matters are now in the hands of the
juvenile and family courts exclusively.
Successions
R.S. 9:1492, which details the requirements for the publica-
tion of notice of an executor's or administrator's application for
authorization to execute a mineral lease, has been amended2 5 to
specify that the published notice shall contain (1) a description
of the property to be leased, (2) mention of the bonus to be re-
ceived by the executor or administrator, (3) an indication of the
minimum royalty on oil (no mention is made of other minerals)
to be reserved to the succession, and (4) such other information
as the court may require.
R.S. 9:1513 before amendment authorized banks and other
depositaries to pay widows up to five hundred dollars out of
deposits in her name, her deceased husband's, that of the com-
munity between them, or "otherwise," without judicial authori-
zation and before determination of the inheritance tax due, with-
out subjecting them to liability for inheritance taxes or in any
other way. The amendment by Act 559 of 1956 (1) extends the
act to cover payment to widowers as well as to widows and (2)
specifically adds "joint" deposits to the list of those from which
the payments may be made.
R.S. 9:1521, added by Act 387 of 1956, authorizes the public
sale of movable and immovable succession assets for any pur-
pose, and without priority between movables and immovables
except where the sale is made to pay debts or legacies, provided
such sale be in the best interest of the "succession, heirs, and
succession creditors." This legislation parallels R.S. 9:1451-
9:1454 on the private sale of succession assets.
25. La. Acts 1956, No. 474.
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Sale of Land on Rights of Way
Under the new sections 9:2971-9:279326 all future transac-
tions with regard to land fronting on a right of way of any kind
shall be presumed, in the absence of stipulation to the contrary,
to include the contractor's or transferor's interest "under" the
right of way. The statute is also specifically retroactive and
applies to all transfers before its effective date unless the trans-
feror asserts his interest within a year by suit or by recording
an appropriate declaration made before a notary public.
2 7
Privileges and Mortgages
R.S. 9:4861-9:4862, specifying privileges for labor, services,
or supplies furnished in the drilling of oil, gas, and water wells,
are discussed elsewhere in the Symposium.
2s
R.S. 9:5351, on chattel mortgages, was amended 9 to correct
two typographical errors in the amendment by Act 50 of 1952.
The word "or" in the phrase "articles disposed by the mort-
gagor or up to the time of foreclosure" was deleted, and the
word "ordinarily" in the phrase "other things in bulk ordinarily
mortgaged to secure the debt" was changed to read "originally."
R.S. 9:5356 was amended ° to reduce the period after which
the recorder of mortgages may destroy chattel mortgage records
from ten to six years after the last inscription of the mortgage.
Prescription
The new section R.S. 9:5625s1 provides for the prescription of
actions to enforce zoning and other land use restrictions. The
statute bears the scar of a proviso clause apparently added after
the original drafting of the bill and as a result thereof the act
does not read as clearly as one might wish. The following, how-
ever, appears to be its substance: (1) The normal prescriptive
period is two years from the first act constituting the violation.
(2) In the case of a use restriction enforceable by a local govern-
ment unit the period does not begin to run until the government
26. La. Acts 1956, No. 555.
27. The language of Act 555 of 1956 is often improper for our law, e.g., "con-
veyance," "grant," "fee."
28. See page 96 infra.
29. La. Acts 1956, No. 90.
30. La. Acts 1956, No. 203.
31. La. Acts 1956, No. 455.
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unit or its instrumentality has knowledge of the violation. (3)
The act applies to violations which occurred before its effective
date, but in the event the prescriptive period would run in less
than one year from the effective date of the act, the enforcement
suit may be brought within a year of that date.
